Deflock Broward

Broward County, Florida • What the evidence shows

Common claims — and what credible sources say

This site supports removal of automated license plate reader (ALPR) networks. The point is not to debate intentions. It’s to look at what the technology enables at scale — and what tends to happen in real-world deployments.

Claim 1 of 4
“There’s no privacy in public.”
The response

Observation is not the same as systematic tracking.

Seeing a license plate in public is not the same thing as building a searchable database of where vehicles were seen over time. Courts and legal analysis often distinguish between one-off observation and comprehensive, automated tracking. [1] [2] [3]

The practical difference is scale: automated collection removes the ordinary constraints that keep surveillance limited — time, staffing, and friction. When the system is networked and retained, it can function as long-term location tracking infrastructure. [2] [3]

Claim 2 of 4
“It’s just license plates.”
The response

Modern ALPR systems capture far more than a plate number.

Vendor documentation shows that in addition to the plate, systems record date, time, precise location, and vehicle characteristics such as make, model, color, and distinguishing features — often described as a vehicle “fingerprint.” These records are stored in searchable databases. [8] [9] [10]

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A plate number alone is not anonymous. License plates are directly associated with registered owners through state motor vehicle records. Law enforcement agencies routinely access those records under statutory authority, linking a plate to a named individual. [11]
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When plate data is retained over time, it becomes location history. Storing plate numbers alongside time and location creates a historical record of where a specific vehicle was seen. Courts have recognized that long-term location tracking can reveal detailed patterns of life and raise constitutional concerns. [1]
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A large public-records analysis released by EFF and MuckRock documented more than 2.5 billion scans in 2016–2017. About 99.5% of scans were not tied to a vehicle under suspicion at the time of collection. [4]

Taken together, plate identification plus time and location data creates an attributable movement record tied to a specific individual.

Claim 3 of 4
“Misuse is hypothetical.”
The response

Misuse and error are documented realities.

Investigations and prosecutions show officers and agencies have used plate reader systems improperly, including in stalking contexts. [6] [7]

Separate from misuse, false positives and database errors can produce dangerous outcomes. A CBS News investigation verified more than a dozen instances involving wrongful stops, and also reported instances of misuse involving ALPR systems. [5]

Our position

Why this site still argues for removal.

If ALPR networks only worked as narrow tools — with short retention, strict access controls, strong auditing, and no sharing — the debate would look different. Public records and national reporting document large-scale data collection and inter-agency sharing of ALPR data, including extensive scanning even when individuals are not suspected of wrongdoing. [4]

That’s why Deflock Broward’s position is removal: the most reliable safeguard is not a policy document — it’s the absence of the tracking infrastructure.

See the primary documents →
Sources

References

  1. Carpenter v. United States (2018), Supreme Court opinion (Cornell LII). law.cornell.edu →
  2. United States v. Jones (2012), Supreme Court decision (Library of Congress). loc.gov →
  3. Commonwealth v. McCarthy (2020), Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. justia.com →
  4. EFF: “Data Driven: Explore How Cops Are Collecting and Sharing Our Travel Patterns Using Automated License Plate Readers.” eff.org →
  5. CBS News (July 24, 2025): “When license plate readers get it wrong.” cbsnews.com →
  6. KWCH (Oct 30, 2022): “Kechi police lieutenant arrested for using police technology to stalk wife.” kwch.com →
  7. WBAY (Jan 20, 2026): “Menasha police officer charged with misconduct bound over for trial” (references alleged misuse of Flock system). wbay.com →
  8. Flock Safety. “Investing in Flock Safety.” a16z. a16z.com →
  9. Pelco. “License Plate Recognition.” pelco.com →
  10. Visive. “Automated Number Plate Recognition.” visive.ai →
  11. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq. law.cornell.edu →