Claim: “There’s no privacy in public.”
Seeing a license plate in public is not the same thing as building a searchable database of where vehicles were seen over time. Courts and legal analysis often distinguish between one-off observation and comprehensive, automated tracking. [1] [2] [3]
The practical difference is scale: automated collection removes the ordinary constraints that keep surveillance limited (time, staffing, and friction). When the system is networked and retained, it can function as long-term location tracking infrastructure. [2] [3]
Claim: “It’s just license plates.”
Modern ALPR systems capture more than a plate number. Vendor documentation shows that in addition to the plate, systems record date, time, precise location, and vehicle characteristics such as make, model, color, and distinguishing features—often described as a vehicle “fingerprint.” These records are stored in searchable databases. [8][9][10]
A plate number alone is not anonymous. License plates are directly associated with registered owners through state motor vehicle records. Law enforcement agencies routinely access those records under statutory authority, linking a plate to a named individual. [11]
When plate data is retained over time, it becomes location history. Storing plate numbers alongside time and location creates a historical record of where a specific vehicle was seen. Courts have recognized that long-term location tracking can reveal detailed patterns of life and raise constitutional concerns. [1]
A large public-records analysis released by EFF and MuckRock documented more than 2.5 billion scans in 2016–2017. The same analysis reported that about 99.5% of scans were not tied to a vehicle under suspicion at the time of collection. [4]
Taken together, plate identification plus time and location data creates an attributable movement record tied to a specific individual.
Claim: “Misuse is hypothetical.”
Misuse and error are documented realities. Investigations and prosecutions show officers and agencies have used plate reader systems improperly, including in stalking contexts. [6] [7]
Separate from misuse, false positives and database errors can produce dangerous outcomes. A CBS News investigation verified more than a dozen instances involving wrongful stops, and also reported instances of misuse involving ALPR systems. [5]
Why this site still argues for removal
If ALPR networks only worked as narrow tools with short retention, strict access controls, strong auditing, and no sharing, the debate would look different. Public records and national reporting document large-scale data collection and inter-agency sharing of ALPR data, including extensive scanning even when individuals are not suspected of wrongdoing. [4]
That’s why Deflock Broward’s position is removal: the most reliable safeguard is not a policy document—it’s the absence of the tracking infrastructure.